feat(runtime): Allow embedders to perform additional access checks on file open (#23208)

Embedders may have special requirements around file opening, so we add a
new `check_open` permission check that is called as part of the file
open process.
This commit is contained in:
Matt Mastracci 2024-04-19 18:12:03 -06:00 committed by GitHub
parent 365e1f48f7
commit 472a370640
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
17 changed files with 476 additions and 121 deletions

View file

@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ use fqdn::FQDN;
use once_cell::sync::Lazy;
use std::borrow::Cow;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::ffi::OsStr;
use std::fmt;
use std::fmt::Debug;
use std::hash::Hash;
@ -1641,6 +1642,91 @@ impl PermissionsContainer {
self.0.lock().env.check_all()
}
#[inline(always)]
pub fn check_sys_all(&mut self) -> Result<(), AnyError> {
self.0.lock().sys.check_all()
}
#[inline(always)]
pub fn check_ffi_all(&mut self) -> Result<(), AnyError> {
self.0.lock().ffi.check_all()
}
/// This checks to see if the allow-all flag was passed, not whether all
/// permissions are enabled!
#[inline(always)]
pub fn check_was_allow_all_flag_passed(&mut self) -> Result<(), AnyError> {
self.0.lock().all.check()
}
/// Checks special file access, returning the failed permission type if
/// not successful.
pub fn check_special_file(
&mut self,
path: &Path,
_api_name: &str,
) -> Result<(), &'static str> {
let error_all = |_| "all";
// Safe files with no major additional side-effects. While there's a small risk of someone
// draining system entropy by just reading one of these files constantly, that's not really
// something we worry about as they already have --allow-read to /dev.
if cfg!(unix)
&& (path == OsStr::new("/dev/random")
|| path == OsStr::new("/dev/urandom")
|| path == OsStr::new("/dev/zero")
|| path == OsStr::new("/dev/null"))
{
return Ok(());
}
if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
if path.starts_with("/dev")
|| path.starts_with("/proc")
|| path.starts_with("/sys")
{
if path.ends_with("/environ") {
self.check_env_all().map_err(|_| "env")?;
} else {
self.check_was_allow_all_flag_passed().map_err(error_all)?;
}
}
if path.starts_with("/etc") {
self.check_was_allow_all_flag_passed().map_err(error_all)?;
}
} else if cfg!(unix) {
if path.starts_with("/dev") {
self.check_was_allow_all_flag_passed().map_err(error_all)?;
}
if path.starts_with("/etc") {
self.check_was_allow_all_flag_passed().map_err(error_all)?;
}
if path.starts_with("/private/etc") {
self.check_was_allow_all_flag_passed().map_err(error_all)?;
}
} else if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
fn is_normalized_windows_drive_path(path: &Path) -> bool {
let s = path.as_os_str().as_encoded_bytes();
// \\?\X:\
if s.len() < 7 {
false
} else if s.starts_with(br#"\\?\"#) {
s[4].is_ascii_alphabetic() && s[5] == b':' && s[6] == b'\\'
} else {
false
}
}
// If this is a normalized drive path, accept it
if !is_normalized_windows_drive_path(path) {
self.check_was_allow_all_flag_passed().map_err(error_all)?;
}
} else {
unimplemented!()
}
Ok(())
}
#[inline(always)]
pub fn check_net_url(
&mut self,
@ -2795,7 +2881,6 @@ mod tests {
fn test_check_fail() {
set_prompter(Box::new(TestPrompter));
let mut perms = Permissions::none_with_prompt();
let prompt_value = PERMISSION_PROMPT_STUB_VALUE_SETTER.lock();
prompt_value.set(false);