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SF bug 533625 (Armin Rigo). rexec: potential security hole

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If a rexec instance allows writing in the current directory (a common
thing to do), there's a way to execute bogus bytecode.  Fix this by
not allowing imports from .pyc files (in a way that allows a site to
configure things so that .pyc files *are* allowed, if writing is not
allowed).

I'll apply this to 2.2 and 2.1 too.
This commit is contained in:
Guido van Rossum 2002-05-31 21:12:53 +00:00
parent 9788384d02
commit 59b2a74c75
2 changed files with 23 additions and 1 deletions
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12
Doc/lib/librexec.tex
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@ -211,6 +211,18 @@ environment. The value for \class{RExec} is \code{('ps1', 'ps2',
'copyright', 'version', 'platform', 'exit', 'maxint')}.
\end{memberdesc}
\begin{memberdesc}{ok_file_types}
Contains the file types from which modules are allowed to be loaded.
Each file type is an integer constant defined in the \refmodule{imp} module.
The meaningful values are \constant{PY_SOURCE}, \constant{PY_COMPILED}, and
\constant{C_EXTENSION}. The value for \class{RExec} is \code{(C_EXTENSION,
PY_SOURCE)}. Adding \constant{PY_COMPILED} in subclasses is not recommended;
an attacker could exit the restricted execution mode by putting a forged
byte-compiled file (\file{.pyc}) anywhere in your file system, for example
by writing it to \file{/tmp} or uploading it to the \file{/incoming}
directory of your public FTP server.
\end{memberdesc}
\subsection{An example}