bpo-43998: Default to TLS 1.2 and increase cipher suite security (GH-25778)

The ssl module now has more secure default settings. Ciphers without forward
secrecy or SHA-1 MAC are disabled by default. Security level 2 prohibits
weak RSA, DH, and ECC keys with less than 112 bits of security.
:class:`~ssl.SSLContext` defaults to minimum protocol version TLS 1.2.
Settings are based on Hynek Schlawack's research.

```
$ openssl version
OpenSSL 1.1.1k  FIPS 25 Mar 2021
$ openssl ciphers -v '@SECLEVEL=2:ECDH+AESGCM:ECDH+CHACHA20:ECDH+AES:DHE+AES:!aNULL:!eNULL:!aDSS:!SHA1:!AESCCM'
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384  TLSv1.3 Kx=any      Au=any  Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 TLSv1.3 Kx=any      Au=any  Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256  TLSv1.3 Kx=any      Au=any  Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256  TLSv1.3 Kx=any      Au=any  Enc=AESCCM(128) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=RSA  Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=RSA  Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=ECDSA Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=RSA  Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(256)  Mac=SHA384
ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=RSA  Enc=AES(256)  Mac=SHA384
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128)  Mac=SHA256
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH     Au=RSA  Enc=AES(128)  Mac=SHA256
DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH       Au=RSA  Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH       Au=RSA  Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256   TLSv1.2 Kx=DH       Au=RSA  Enc=AES(256)  Mac=SHA256
DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256   TLSv1.2 Kx=DH       Au=RSA  Enc=AES(128)  Mac=SHA256
```

Signed-off-by: Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>
This commit is contained in:
Christian Heimes 2021-05-01 20:53:10 +02:00 committed by GitHub
parent 50c21ad353
commit e983252b51
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
8 changed files with 88 additions and 18 deletions

View file

@ -152,15 +152,27 @@ extern const SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_2_method(void);
#ifndef PY_SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_STRING
#error "Py_SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHERS 0 needs Py_SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_STRING"
#endif
#ifndef PY_SSL_MIN_PROTOCOL
#define PY_SSL_MIN_PROTOCOL TLS1_2_VERSION
#endif
#elif PY_SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHERS == 1
/* Python custom selection of sensible cipher suites
* DEFAULT: OpenSSL's default cipher list. Since 1.0.2 the list is in sensible order.
* @SECLEVEL=2: security level 2 with 112 bits minimum security (e.g. 2048 bits RSA key)
* ECDH+*: enable ephemeral elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
* DHE+*: fallback to ephemeral finite field Diffie-Hellman
* encryption order: AES AEAD (GCM), ChaCha AEAD, AES CBC
* !aNULL:!eNULL: really no NULL ciphers
* !MD5:!3DES:!DES:!RC4:!IDEA:!SEED: no weak or broken algorithms on old OpenSSL versions.
* !aDSS: no authentication with discrete logarithm DSA algorithm
* !SRP:!PSK: no secure remote password or pre-shared key authentication
* !SHA1: no weak SHA1 MAC
* !AESCCM: no CCM mode, it's uncommon and slow
*
* Based on Hynek's excellent blog post (update 2021-02-11)
* https://hynek.me/articles/hardening-your-web-servers-ssl-ciphers/
*/
#define PY_SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_STRING "DEFAULT:!aNULL:!eNULL:!MD5:!3DES:!DES:!RC4:!IDEA:!SEED:!aDSS:!SRP:!PSK"
#define PY_SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_STRING "@SECLEVEL=2:ECDH+AESGCM:ECDH+CHACHA20:ECDH+AES:DHE+AES:!aNULL:!eNULL:!aDSS:!SHA1:!AESCCM"
#ifndef PY_SSL_MIN_PROTOCOL
#define PY_SSL_MIN_PROTOCOL TLS1_2_VERSION
#endif
#elif PY_SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHERS == 2
/* Ignored in SSLContext constructor, only used to as _ssl.DEFAULT_CIPHER_STRING */
#define PY_SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_STRING SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST
@ -3095,8 +3107,25 @@ _ssl__SSLContext_impl(PyTypeObject *type, int proto_version)
ERR_clear_error();
PyErr_SetString(get_state_ctx(self)->PySSLErrorObject,
"No cipher can be selected.");
return NULL;
goto error;
}
#ifdef PY_SSL_MIN_PROTOCOL
switch(proto_version) {
case PY_SSL_VERSION_TLS:
case PY_SSL_VERSION_TLS_CLIENT:
case PY_SSL_VERSION_TLS_SERVER:
result = SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, PY_SSL_MIN_PROTOCOL);
if (result == 0) {
PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
"Failed to set minimum protocol 0x%x",
PY_SSL_MIN_PROTOCOL);
goto error;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
#endif
/* Set SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS. This potentially greatly reduces memory
usage for no cost at all. */
@ -3119,6 +3148,10 @@ _ssl__SSLContext_impl(PyTypeObject *type, int proto_version)
#endif
return (PyObject *)self;
error:
Py_XDECREF(self);
ERR_clear_error();
return NULL;
}
static int