........
r87890 | georg.brandl | 2011-01-09 10:04:08 +0100 (So, 09 Jan 2011) | 1 line
Wrap some long examples and signatures.
........
r87891 | georg.brandl | 2011-01-09 10:31:01 +0100 (So, 09 Jan 2011) | 1 line
#10871: "file" does not exist anymore in Python 3. Also adapt the reprs of opened file objects.
........
svn+ssh://svn.python.org/python/branches/py3k
........
r87789 | georg.brandl | 2011-01-06 10:23:56 +0100 (Do, 06 Jan 2011) | 1 line
Fix various issues (mostly Python 2 relics) found by Jacques Ducasse.
........
r87790 | georg.brandl | 2011-01-06 10:25:27 +0100 (Do, 06 Jan 2011) | 1 line
Add acks where acks are due.
........
svn+ssh://svn.python.org/python/branches/py3k
........
r87791 | georg.brandl | 2011-01-06 11:05:26 +0100 (Do, 06 Jan 2011) | 1 line
#10844: update copyright years in Mac plists.
........
svn+ssh://pythondev@svn.python.org/python/branches/py3k
........
r87873 | r.david.murray | 2011-01-08 21:35:24 -0500 (Sat, 08 Jan 2011) | 12 lines
#5871: protect against header injection attacks.
This makes Header.encode throw a HeaderParseError if it winds up
formatting a header such that a continuation line has no leading
whitespace and looks like a header. Since Header accepts values
containing newlines and preserves them (and this is by design), without
this fix any program that took user input (say, a subject in a web form)
and passed it to the email package as a header was vulnerable to header
injection attacks. (As far as we know this has never been exploited.)
Thanks to Jakub Wilk for reporting this vulnerability.
........
This makes Header.encode throw a HeaderParseError if it winds up
formatting a header such that a continuation line has no leading
whitespace and looks like a header. Since Header accepts values
containing newlines and preserves them (and this is by design), without
this fix any program that took user input (say, a subject in a web form)
and passed it to the email package as a header was vulnerable to header
injection attacks. (As far as we know this has never been exploited.)
Thanks to Jakub Wilk for reporting this vulnerability.
........
r87840 | r.david.murray | 2011-01-07 18:25:30 -0500 (Fri, 07 Jan 2011) | 6 lines
#10686: recode non-ASCII headers to 'unknown-8bit' instead of ?s.
This applies only when generating strings from non-RFC compliant binary
input; it makes the existing recoding behavior more consistent (ie:
now no data is lost when recoding).
........
