uv/crates/uv-git/src/known_hosts.rs
danieleades 8d721830db
Clippy pedantic (#1963)
Address a few pedantic lints

lints are separated into separate commits so they can be reviewed
individually.

I've not added enforcement for any of these lints, but that could be
added if desirable.
2024-02-25 14:04:05 -05:00

872 lines
37 KiB
Rust

//! Git support is derived from Cargo's implementation.
//! Cargo is dual-licensed under either Apache 2.0 or MIT, at the user's choice.
//! Source: <https://github.com/rust-lang/cargo/blob/23eb492cf920ce051abfc56bbaf838514dc8365c/src/cargo/sources/git/known_hosts.rs>
//!
//! SSH host key validation support.
//!
//! The only public item in this module is [`certificate_check`],
//! which provides a callback to [`git2::RemoteCallbacks::certificate_check`].
//!
//! A primary goal with this implementation is to provide user-friendly error
//! messages, guiding them to understand the issue and how to resolve it.
//!
//! Note that there are a lot of limitations here. This reads OpenSSH
//! `known_hosts` files from well-known locations, but it does not read OpenSSH
//! config files. The config file can change the behavior of how OpenSSH
//! handles `known_hosts` files. For example, some things we don't handle:
//!
//! - `GlobalKnownHostsFile` — Changes the location of the global host file.
//! - `UserKnownHostsFile` — Changes the location of the user's host file.
//! - `KnownHostsCommand` — A command to fetch known hosts.
//! - `CheckHostIP` — DNS spoofing checks.
//! - `VisualHostKey` — Shows a visual ascii-art key.
//! - `VerifyHostKeyDNS` — Uses SSHFP DNS records to fetch a host key.
//!
//! There's also a number of things that aren't supported but could be easily
//! added (it just adds a little complexity). For example, hostname patterns,
//! and revoked markers. See "FIXME" comments littered in this file.
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD_NO_PAD;
use base64::Engine as _;
use git2::cert::{Cert, SshHostKeyType};
use git2::CertificateCheckStatus;
use hmac::Mac;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::fmt::{Display, Write};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
/// These are host keys that are hard-coded in cargo to provide convenience.
///
/// If GitHub ever publishes new keys, the user can add them to their own
/// configuration file to use those instead.
///
/// The GitHub keys are sourced from <https://api.github.com/meta> or
/// <https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/keeping-your-account-and-data-secure/githubs-ssh-key-fingerprints>.
///
/// These will be ignored if the user adds their own entries for `github.com`,
/// which can be useful if GitHub ever revokes their old keys.
static BUNDLED_KEYS: &[(&str, &str, &str)] = &[
("github.com", "ssh-ed25519", "AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIOMqqnkVzrm0SdG6UOoqKLsabgH5C9okWi0dh2l9GKJl"),
("github.com", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBEmKSENjQEezOmxkZMy7opKgwFB9nkt5YRrYMjNuG5N87uRgg6CLrbo5wAdT/y6v0mKV0U2w0WZ2YB/++Tpockg="),
("github.com", "ssh-rsa", "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"),
];
/// List of keys that public hosts have rotated away from.
///
/// We explicitly distrust these keys as users with the old key in their
/// local configuration will otherwise be vulnerable to MITM attacks if the
/// attacker has access to the old key. As there is no other way to distribute
/// revocations of ssh host keys, we need to bundle them with the client.
///
/// Unlike [`BUNDLED_KEYS`], these revocations will not be ignored if the user
/// has their own entries: we *know* that these keys are bad.
static BUNDLED_REVOCATIONS: &[(&str, &str, &str)] = &[
// Used until March 24, 2023: https://github.blog/2023-03-23-we-updated-our-rsa-ssh-host-key/
("github.com", "ssh-rsa", "AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAq2A7hRGmdnm9tUDbO9IDSwBK6TbQa+PXYPCPy6rbTrTtw7PHkccKrpp0yVhp5HdEIcKr6pLlVDBfOLX9QUsyCOV0wzfjIJNlGEYsdlLJizHhbn2mUjvSAHQqZETYP81eFzLQNnPHt4EVVUh7VfDESU84KezmD5QlWpXLmvU31/yMf+Se8xhHTvKSCZIFImWwoG6mbUoWf9nzpIoaSjB+weqqUUmpaaasXVal72J+UX2B+2RPW3RcT0eOzQgqlJL3RKrTJvdsjE3JEAvGq3lGHSZXy28G3skua2SmVi/w4yCE6gbODqnTWlg7+wC604ydGXA8VJiS5ap43JXiUFFAaQ=="),
];
enum KnownHostError {
/// Some general error happened while validating the known hosts.
CheckError(anyhow::Error),
/// The host key was not found.
HostKeyNotFound {
hostname: String,
key_type: SshHostKeyType,
remote_host_key: String,
remote_fingerprint: String,
other_hosts: Vec<KnownHost>,
},
/// The host key was found, but does not match the remote's key.
HostKeyHasChanged {
hostname: String,
key_type: SshHostKeyType,
old_known_host: KnownHost,
remote_host_key: String,
remote_fingerprint: String,
},
/// The host key was found with a @revoked marker, it must not be accepted.
HostKeyRevoked {
hostname: String,
key_type: SshHostKeyType,
remote_host_key: String,
location: KnownHostLocation,
},
/// The host key was not found, but there was a matching known host with a
/// @cert-authority marker (which Cargo doesn't yet support).
HostHasOnlyCertAuthority {
hostname: String,
location: KnownHostLocation,
},
}
impl From<anyhow::Error> for KnownHostError {
fn from(err: anyhow::Error) -> Self {
Self::CheckError(err)
}
}
/// The location where a host key was located.
#[derive(Clone)]
enum KnownHostLocation {
/// Loaded from a file from disk.
File { path: PathBuf, lineno: usize },
/// Part of the hard-coded bundled keys in Cargo.
Bundled,
}
impl Display for KnownHostLocation {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
let loc = match self {
Self::File { path, lineno } => {
format!("{} line {lineno}", path.display())
}
Self::Bundled => "bundled with cargo".to_string(),
};
f.write_str(&loc)
}
}
/// The git2 callback used to validate a certificate (only ssh known hosts are validated).
pub(crate) fn certificate_check(
cert: &Cert<'_>,
host: &str,
port: Option<u16>,
) -> Result<CertificateCheckStatus, git2::Error> {
let Some(host_key) = cert.as_hostkey() else {
// Return passthrough for TLS X509 certificates to use whatever validation
// was done in git2.
return Ok(CertificateCheckStatus::CertificatePassthrough);
};
// If a nonstandard port is in use, check for that first.
// The fallback to check without a port is handled in the HostKeyNotFound handler.
let host_maybe_port = match port {
Some(port) if port != 22 => format!("[{host}]:{port}"),
_ => host.to_string(),
};
// The error message must be constructed as a string to pass through the libgit2 C API.
let err_msg = match check_ssh_known_hosts(host_key, &host_maybe_port) {
Ok(()) => {
return Ok(CertificateCheckStatus::CertificateOk);
}
Err(KnownHostError::CheckError(e)) => {
format!("error: failed to validate host key:\n{e:#}")
}
Err(KnownHostError::HostKeyNotFound {
hostname,
key_type,
remote_host_key,
remote_fingerprint,
other_hosts,
}) => {
// Try checking without the port.
if port.is_some()
&& !matches!(port, Some(22))
&& check_ssh_known_hosts(host_key, host).is_ok()
{
return Ok(CertificateCheckStatus::CertificateOk);
}
let key_type_short_name = key_type.short_name();
let key_type_name = key_type.name();
let other_hosts_message = if other_hosts.is_empty() {
String::new()
} else {
let mut msg = String::from(
"Note: This host key was found, \
but is associated with a different host:\n",
);
for known_host in other_hosts {
writeln!(
msg,
" {loc}: {patterns}",
loc = known_host.location,
patterns = known_host.patterns
)
.unwrap();
}
msg
};
format!("error: unknown SSH host key\n\
The SSH host key for `{hostname}` is not known and cannot be validated.\n\
\n\
To resolve this issue, add the host key to the list of known hosts.\n\
\n\
The key to add is:\n\
\n\
{hostname} {key_type_name} {remote_host_key}\n\
\n\
The {key_type_short_name} key fingerprint is: SHA256:{remote_fingerprint}\n\
This fingerprint should be validated with the server administrator that it is correct.\n\
{other_hosts_message}\n\
See https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/cargo/appendix/git-authentication.html#ssh-known-hosts \
for more information.\n\
")
}
Err(KnownHostError::HostKeyHasChanged {
hostname,
key_type,
old_known_host,
remote_host_key,
remote_fingerprint,
}) => {
let key_type_short_name = key_type.short_name();
let key_type_name = key_type.name();
let old_key_resolution = match old_known_host.location {
KnownHostLocation::File { path, lineno } => {
let old_key_location = path.display();
format!(
"removing the old {key_type_name} key for `{hostname}` \
located at {old_key_location} line {lineno}, \
and adding the new key to the list of known hosts.",
)
}
KnownHostLocation::Bundled => "adding the new key to the list of known hosts.\n\
The current host key is bundled as part of Cargo."
.to_string(),
};
format!("error: SSH host key has changed for `{hostname}`\n\
*********************************\n\
* WARNING: HOST KEY HAS CHANGED *\n\
*********************************\n\
This may be caused by a man-in-the-middle attack, or the \
server may have changed its host key.\n\
\n\
The {key_type_short_name} fingerprint for the key from the remote host is:\n\
SHA256:{remote_fingerprint}\n\
\n\
You are strongly encouraged to contact the server \
administrator for `{hostname}` to verify that this new key is \
correct.\n\
\n\
If you can verify that the server has a new key, you can \
resolve this error by {old_key_resolution}\n\
\n\
The key provided by the remote host is:\n\
\n\
{hostname} {key_type_name} {remote_host_key}\n\
\n\
See https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/cargo/appendix/git-authentication.html#ssh-known-hosts \
for more information.\n\
")
}
Err(KnownHostError::HostKeyRevoked {
hostname,
key_type,
remote_host_key,
location,
}) => {
let key_type_short_name = key_type.short_name();
format!(
"error: Key has been revoked for `{hostname}`\n\
**************************************\n\
* WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED *\n\
**************************************\n\
This may indicate that the key provided by this host has been\n\
compromised and should not be accepted.
\n\
The host key {key_type_short_name} {remote_host_key} is revoked\n\
in {location} and has been rejected.\n\
"
)
}
Err(KnownHostError::HostHasOnlyCertAuthority { hostname, location }) => {
format!("error: Found a `@cert-authority` marker for `{hostname}`\n\
\n\
Cargo doesn't support certificate authorities for host key verification. It is\n\
recommended that the command line Git client is used instead. This can be achieved\n\
by setting `net.git-fetch-with-cli` to `true` in the Cargo config.\n\
\n
The `@cert-authority` line was found in {location}.\n\
\n\
See https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/cargo/appendix/git-authentication.html#ssh-known-hosts \
for more information.\n\
")
}
};
Err(git2::Error::new(
git2::ErrorCode::GenericError,
git2::ErrorClass::Callback,
err_msg,
))
}
/// Checks if the given host/host key pair is known.
#[allow(clippy::result_large_err)]
fn check_ssh_known_hosts(
cert_host_key: &git2::cert::CertHostkey<'_>,
host: &str,
) -> Result<(), KnownHostError> {
let Some(remote_host_key) = cert_host_key.hostkey() else {
return Err(anyhow::format_err!("remote host key is not available").into());
};
let remote_key_type = cert_host_key.hostkey_type().unwrap();
// Collect all the known host entries from disk.
let mut known_hosts = Vec::new();
for path in known_host_files() {
if !path.exists() {
continue;
}
let hosts = load_hostfile(&path)?;
known_hosts.extend(hosts);
}
// Load the bundled keys. Don't add keys for hosts that the user has
// configured, which gives them the option to override them. This could be
// useful if the keys are ever revoked.
let configured_hosts: HashSet<_> = known_hosts
.iter()
.flat_map(|known_host| known_host.patterns.split(',').map(str::to_lowercase))
.collect();
for (patterns, key_type, key) in BUNDLED_KEYS {
if !configured_hosts.contains(*patterns) {
let key = STANDARD.decode(key).unwrap();
known_hosts.push(KnownHost {
location: KnownHostLocation::Bundled,
patterns: (*patterns).to_string(),
key_type: (*key_type).to_string(),
key,
line_type: KnownHostLineType::Key,
});
}
}
for (patterns, key_type, key) in BUNDLED_REVOCATIONS {
let key = STANDARD.decode(key).unwrap();
known_hosts.push(KnownHost {
location: KnownHostLocation::Bundled,
patterns: (*patterns).to_string(),
key_type: (*key_type).to_string(),
key,
line_type: KnownHostLineType::Revoked,
});
}
check_ssh_known_hosts_loaded(&known_hosts, host, remote_key_type, remote_host_key)
}
/// Checks a host key against a loaded set of known hosts.
#[allow(clippy::result_large_err)]
fn check_ssh_known_hosts_loaded(
known_hosts: &[KnownHost],
host: &str,
remote_key_type: SshHostKeyType,
remote_host_key: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), KnownHostError> {
// `latent_error` keeps track of a potential error that will be returned
// in case a matching host key isn't found.
let mut latent_errors: Vec<KnownHostError> = Vec::new();
// `other_hosts` keeps track of any entries that have an identical key,
// but a different hostname.
let mut other_hosts = Vec::new();
// `accepted_known_host_found` keeps track of whether we've found a matching
// line in the `known_hosts` file that we would accept. We can't return that
// immediately, because there may be a subsequent @revoked key.
let mut accepted_known_host_found = false;
// Older versions of OpenSSH (before 6.8, March 2015) showed MD5
// fingerprints (see FingerprintHash ssh config option). Here we only
// support SHA256.
let mut remote_fingerprint = cargo_util::Sha256::new();
remote_fingerprint.update(remote_host_key);
let remote_fingerprint = STANDARD_NO_PAD.encode(remote_fingerprint.finish());
let remote_host_key_encoded = STANDARD.encode(remote_host_key);
for known_host in known_hosts {
// The key type from libgit2 needs to match the key type from the host file.
if known_host.key_type != remote_key_type.name() {
continue;
}
let key_matches = known_host.key == remote_host_key;
if !known_host.host_matches(host) {
if key_matches {
other_hosts.push(known_host.clone());
}
continue;
}
match known_host.line_type {
KnownHostLineType::Key => {
if key_matches {
accepted_known_host_found = true;
} else {
// The host and key type matched, but the key itself did not.
// This indicates the key has changed.
// This is only reported as an error if no subsequent lines have a
// correct key.
latent_errors.push(KnownHostError::HostKeyHasChanged {
hostname: host.to_string(),
key_type: remote_key_type,
old_known_host: known_host.clone(),
remote_host_key: remote_host_key_encoded.clone(),
remote_fingerprint: remote_fingerprint.clone(),
});
}
}
KnownHostLineType::Revoked => {
if key_matches {
return Err(KnownHostError::HostKeyRevoked {
hostname: host.to_string(),
key_type: remote_key_type,
remote_host_key: remote_host_key_encoded,
location: known_host.location.clone(),
});
}
}
KnownHostLineType::CertAuthority => {
// The host matches a @cert-authority line, which is unsupported.
latent_errors.push(KnownHostError::HostHasOnlyCertAuthority {
hostname: host.to_string(),
location: known_host.location.clone(),
});
}
}
}
// We have an accepted host key and it hasn't been revoked.
if accepted_known_host_found {
return Ok(());
}
if latent_errors.is_empty() {
// FIXME: Ideally the error message should include the IP address of the
// remote host (to help the user validate that they are connecting to the
// host they were expecting to). However, I don't see a way to obtain that
// information from libgit2.
Err(KnownHostError::HostKeyNotFound {
hostname: host.to_string(),
key_type: remote_key_type,
remote_host_key: remote_host_key_encoded,
remote_fingerprint,
other_hosts,
})
} else {
// We're going to take the first HostKeyHasChanged error if
// we find one, otherwise we'll take the first error (which
// we expect to be a CertAuthority error).
if let Some(index) = latent_errors
.iter()
.position(|e| matches!(e, KnownHostError::HostKeyHasChanged { .. }))
{
Err(latent_errors.remove(index))
} else {
// Otherwise, we take the first error (which we expect to be
// a CertAuthority error).
Err(latent_errors.pop().unwrap())
}
}
}
/// Returns a list of files to try loading OpenSSH-formatted known hosts.
fn known_host_files() -> Vec<PathBuf> {
let mut result = Vec::new();
if cfg!(unix) {
result.push(PathBuf::from("/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts"));
} else if cfg!(windows) {
// The msys/cygwin version of OpenSSH uses `/etc` from the posix root
// filesystem there (such as `C:\msys64\etc\ssh\ssh_known_hosts`).
// However, I do not know of a way to obtain that location from
// Windows-land. The ProgramData version here is what the PowerShell
// port of OpenSSH does.
if let Some(progdata) = std::env::var_os("ProgramData") {
let mut progdata = PathBuf::from(progdata);
progdata.push("ssh");
progdata.push("ssh_known_hosts");
result.push(progdata);
}
}
result.extend(user_known_host_location());
result
}
/// The location of the user's `known_hosts` file.
fn user_known_host_location() -> Option<PathBuf> {
// NOTE: This is a potentially inaccurate prediction of what the user
// actually wants. The actual location depends on several factors:
//
// - Windows OpenSSH Powershell version: I believe this looks up the home
// directory via ProfileImagePath in the registry, falling back to
// `GetWindowsDirectoryW` if that fails.
// - OpenSSH Portable (under msys): This is very complicated. I got lost
// after following it through some ldap/active directory stuff.
// - OpenSSH (most unix platforms): Uses `pw->pw_dir` from `getpwuid()`.
//
// This doesn't do anything close to that. home_dir's behavior is:
// - Windows: $USERPROFILE, or SHGetKnownFolderPath()
// - Unix: $HOME, or getpwuid_r()
//
// Since there is a mismatch here, the location returned here might be
// different than what the user's `ssh` CLI command uses. We may want to
// consider trying to align it better.
home::home_dir().map(|mut home| {
home.push(".ssh");
home.push("known_hosts");
home
})
}
const HASH_HOSTNAME_PREFIX: &str = "|1|";
#[derive(Clone)]
enum KnownHostLineType {
Key,
CertAuthority,
Revoked,
}
/// A single known host entry.
#[derive(Clone)]
struct KnownHost {
location: KnownHostLocation,
/// The hostname. May be comma separated to match multiple hosts.
patterns: String,
key_type: String,
key: Vec<u8>,
line_type: KnownHostLineType,
}
impl KnownHost {
/// Returns whether or not the given host matches this known host entry.
fn host_matches(&self, host: &str) -> bool {
let mut match_found = false;
let host = host.to_lowercase();
if let Some(hashed) = self.patterns.strip_prefix(HASH_HOSTNAME_PREFIX) {
return hashed_hostname_matches(&host, hashed);
}
for pattern in self.patterns.split(',') {
let pattern = pattern.to_lowercase();
// FIXME: support * and ? wildcards
if let Some(pattern) = pattern.strip_prefix('!') {
if pattern == host {
return false;
}
} else {
match_found |= pattern == host;
}
}
match_found
}
}
fn hashed_hostname_matches(host: &str, hashed: &str) -> bool {
let Some((b64_salt, b64_host)) = hashed.split_once('|') else {
return false;
};
let Ok(salt) = STANDARD.decode(b64_salt) else {
return false;
};
let Ok(hashed_host) = STANDARD.decode(b64_host) else {
return false;
};
let Ok(mut mac) = hmac::Hmac::<sha1::Sha1>::new_from_slice(&salt) else {
return false;
};
mac.update(host.as_bytes());
let result = mac.finalize().into_bytes();
hashed_host == result[..]
}
/// Loads an OpenSSH `known_hosts` file.
fn load_hostfile(path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<KnownHost>, anyhow::Error> {
let contents = cargo_util::paths::read(path)?;
Ok(load_hostfile_contents(path, &contents))
}
fn load_hostfile_contents(path: &Path, contents: &str) -> Vec<KnownHost> {
let entries = contents
.lines()
.enumerate()
.filter_map(|(lineno, line)| {
let location = KnownHostLocation::File {
path: path.to_path_buf(),
lineno: lineno + 1,
};
parse_known_hosts_line(line, location)
})
.collect();
entries
}
fn parse_known_hosts_line(line: &str, location: KnownHostLocation) -> Option<KnownHost> {
let line = line.trim();
if line.is_empty() || line.starts_with('#') {
return None;
}
let mut parts = line.split([' ', '\t']).filter(|s| !s.is_empty());
let line_type = if line.starts_with('@') {
let line_type = parts.next()?;
if line_type == "@cert-authority" {
KnownHostLineType::CertAuthority
} else if line_type == "@revoked" {
KnownHostLineType::Revoked
} else {
// No other markers are defined
return None;
}
} else {
KnownHostLineType::Key
};
let patterns = parts.next()?;
let key_type = parts.next()?;
let key = parts.next().map(|p| STANDARD.decode(p))?.ok()?;
Some(KnownHost {
line_type,
location,
patterns: patterns.to_string(),
key_type: key_type.to_string(),
key,
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
static COMMON_CONTENTS: &str = r"
# Comments allowed at start of line
example.com,rust-lang.org ssh-rsa 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 eric@host
Example.net ssh-dss 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 eric@host
[example.net]:2222 ssh-dss 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 eric@host
nistp256.example.org ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBJ4iYGCcJrUIfrHfzlsv8e8kaF36qpcUpe3VNAKVCZX/BDptIdlEe8u8vKNRTPgUO9jqS0+tjTcPiQd8/8I9qng= eric@host
nistp384.example.org ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBNuGT3TqMz2rcwOt2ZqkiNqq7dvWPE66W2qPCoZsh0pQhVU3BnhKIc6nEr6+Wts0Z3jdF3QWwxbbTjbVTVhdr8fMCFhDCWiQFm9xLerYPKnu9qHvx9K87/fjc5+0pu4hLA== eric@host
nistp521.example.org ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAD35HH6OsK4DN75BrKipVj/GvZaUzjPNa1F8wMjUdPB1JlVcUfgzJjWSxrhmaNN3u0soiZw8WNRFINsGPCw5E7DywF1689WcIj2Ye2rcy99je15FknScTzBBD04JgIyOI50mCUaPCBoF14vFlN6BmO00cFo+yzy5N8GuQ2sx9kr21xmFQ== eric@host
# Revoked is supported, but without Cert-Authority support, it will only negate some other fixed key.
@revoked revoked.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKtQsi+KPYispwm2rkMidQf30fG1Niy8XNkvASfePoca eric@host
# Cert-Authority is not supported (below key should not be valid anyway)
@cert-authority ca.example.com ssh-rsa AABBB5Wm
example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIAWkjI6XT2SZh3xNk5NhisA3o3sGzWR+VAKMSqHtI0aY eric@host
192.168.42.12 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKVYJpa0yUGaNk0NXQTPWa0tHjqRpx+7hl2diReH6DtR eric@host
|1|QxzZoTXIWLhUsuHAXjuDMIV3FjQ=|M6NCOIkjiWdCWqkh5+Q+/uFLGjs= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIHgN3O21U4LWtP5OzjTzPnUnSDmCNDvyvlaj6Hi65JC eric@host
# Negation isn't terribly useful without globs.
neg.example.com,!neg.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIOXfUnaAHTlo1Qi//rNk26OcmHikmkns1Z6WW/UuuS3K eric@host
";
#[test]
fn known_hosts_parse() {
let kh_path = Path::new("/home/abc/.known_hosts");
let khs = load_hostfile_contents(kh_path, COMMON_CONTENTS);
assert_eq!(khs.len(), 12);
match &khs[0].location {
KnownHostLocation::File { path, lineno } => {
assert_eq!(path, kh_path);
assert_eq!(*lineno, 4);
}
KnownHostLocation::Bundled => panic!("unexpected"),
}
assert_eq!(khs[0].patterns, "example.com,rust-lang.org");
assert_eq!(khs[0].key_type, "ssh-rsa");
assert_eq!(khs[0].key.len(), 407);
assert_eq!(&khs[0].key[..30], b"\x00\x00\x00\x07ssh-rsa\x00\x00\x00\x03\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x01\x81\x00\xb935\x88\xa5\x9c)");
match &khs[1].location {
KnownHostLocation::File { path, lineno } => {
assert_eq!(path, kh_path);
assert_eq!(*lineno, 5);
}
KnownHostLocation::Bundled => panic!("unexpected"),
}
assert_eq!(khs[2].patterns, "[example.net]:2222");
assert_eq!(khs[3].patterns, "nistp256.example.org");
assert_eq!(khs[9].patterns, "192.168.42.12");
}
#[test]
fn host_matches() {
let kh_path = Path::new("/home/abc/.known_hosts");
let khs = load_hostfile_contents(kh_path, COMMON_CONTENTS);
assert!(khs[0].host_matches("example.com"));
assert!(khs[0].host_matches("rust-lang.org"));
assert!(khs[0].host_matches("EXAMPLE.COM"));
assert!(khs[1].host_matches("example.net"));
assert!(!khs[0].host_matches("example.net"));
assert!(khs[2].host_matches("[example.net]:2222"));
assert!(!khs[2].host_matches("example.net"));
assert!(khs[10].host_matches("hashed.example.com"));
assert!(!khs[10].host_matches("example.com"));
assert!(!khs[11].host_matches("neg.example.com"));
}
#[test]
fn check_match() {
let kh_path = Path::new("/home/abc/.known_hosts");
let khs = load_hostfile_contents(kh_path, COMMON_CONTENTS);
assert!(check_ssh_known_hosts_loaded(
&khs,
"example.com",
SshHostKeyType::Rsa,
&khs[0].key
)
.is_ok());
match check_ssh_known_hosts_loaded(&khs, "example.com", SshHostKeyType::Dss, &khs[0].key) {
Err(KnownHostError::HostKeyNotFound {
hostname,
remote_fingerprint,
other_hosts,
..
}) => {
assert_eq!(
remote_fingerprint,
"yn+pONDn0EcgdOCVptgB4RZd/wqmsVKrPnQMLtrvhw8"
);
assert_eq!(hostname, "example.com");
assert_eq!(other_hosts.len(), 0);
}
_ => panic!("unexpected"),
}
match check_ssh_known_hosts_loaded(
&khs,
"foo.example.com",
SshHostKeyType::Rsa,
&khs[0].key,
) {
Err(KnownHostError::HostKeyNotFound { other_hosts, .. }) => {
assert_eq!(other_hosts.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(other_hosts[0].patterns, "example.com,rust-lang.org");
}
_ => panic!("unexpected"),
}
let mut modified_key = khs[0].key.clone();
modified_key[0] = 1;
match check_ssh_known_hosts_loaded(&khs, "example.com", SshHostKeyType::Rsa, &modified_key)
{
Err(KnownHostError::HostKeyHasChanged { old_known_host, .. }) => {
assert!(matches!(
old_known_host.location,
KnownHostLocation::File { lineno: 4, .. }
));
}
_ => panic!("unexpected"),
}
}
#[test]
fn revoked() {
let kh_path = Path::new("/home/abc/.known_hosts");
let khs = load_hostfile_contents(kh_path, COMMON_CONTENTS);
match check_ssh_known_hosts_loaded(
&khs,
"revoked.example.com",
SshHostKeyType::Ed255219,
&khs[6].key,
) {
Err(KnownHostError::HostKeyRevoked {
hostname, location, ..
}) => {
assert_eq!("revoked.example.com", hostname);
assert!(matches!(
location,
KnownHostLocation::File { lineno: 11, .. }
));
}
_ => panic!("Expected key to be revoked for revoked.example.com."),
}
}
#[test]
fn cert_authority() {
let kh_path = Path::new("/home/abc/.known_hosts");
let khs = load_hostfile_contents(kh_path, COMMON_CONTENTS);
match check_ssh_known_hosts_loaded(
&khs,
"ca.example.com",
SshHostKeyType::Rsa,
&khs[0].key, // The key should not matter
) {
Err(KnownHostError::HostHasOnlyCertAuthority {
hostname, location, ..
}) => {
assert_eq!("ca.example.com", hostname);
assert!(matches!(
location,
KnownHostLocation::File { lineno: 13, .. }
));
}
Err(KnownHostError::HostKeyNotFound { hostname, .. }) => {
panic!("host key not found... {hostname}");
}
_ => panic!("Expected host to only have @cert-authority line (which is unsupported)."),
}
}
#[test]
fn multiple_errors() {
let contents = r"
not-used.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIAWkjI6XT2SZh3xNk5NhisA3o3sGzWR+VAKMSqHtI0aY eric@host
# Cert-authority and changed key for the same host - changed key error should prevail
@cert-authority example.com ssh-ed25519 AABBB5Wm
example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKVYJpa0yUGaNk0NXQTPWa0tHjqRpx+7hl2diReH6DtR eric@host
";
let kh_path = Path::new("/home/abc/.known_hosts");
let khs = load_hostfile_contents(kh_path, contents);
match check_ssh_known_hosts_loaded(
&khs,
"example.com",
SshHostKeyType::Ed255219,
&khs[0].key,
) {
Err(KnownHostError::HostKeyHasChanged {
hostname,
old_known_host,
remote_host_key,
..
}) => {
assert_eq!("example.com", hostname);
assert_eq!(
"AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIAWkjI6XT2SZh3xNk5NhisA3o3sGzWR+VAKMSqHtI0aY",
remote_host_key
);
assert!(matches!(
old_known_host.location,
KnownHostLocation::File { lineno: 5, .. }
));
}
_ => panic!("Expected error to be of type HostKeyHasChanged."),
}
}
#[test]
fn known_host_and_revoked() {
let contents = r"
example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKVYJpa0yUGaNk0NXQTPWa0tHjqRpx+7hl2diReH6DtR eric@host
# Later in the file the same host key is revoked
@revoked example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKVYJpa0yUGaNk0NXQTPWa0tHjqRpx+7hl2diReH6DtR eric@host
";
let kh_path = Path::new("/home/abc/.known_hosts");
let khs = load_hostfile_contents(kh_path, contents);
match check_ssh_known_hosts_loaded(
&khs,
"example.com",
SshHostKeyType::Ed255219,
&khs[0].key,
) {
Err(KnownHostError::HostKeyRevoked {
hostname,
remote_host_key,
location,
..
}) => {
assert_eq!("example.com", hostname);
assert_eq!(
"AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKVYJpa0yUGaNk0NXQTPWa0tHjqRpx+7hl2diReH6DtR",
remote_host_key
);
assert!(matches!(
location,
KnownHostLocation::File { lineno: 4, .. }
));
}
_ => panic!("Expected host key to be reject with error HostKeyRevoked."),
}
}
}