Closes https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/issues/15818
Unfortunately, this is how we perform lookups. We could also change the
lookup to include the scheme. I expect all of this to change in the
future anyway, as I want to redesign the storage model for native
credentials.
## Summary
This PR adds support for pyx to `uv auth login`, `uv auth logout`, and
`uv auth token`. These are generic uv commands that can be used to store
credentials for arbitrary indexes and other URLs, but we include a
fast-path for pyx that initiates the appropriate login or logout flow.
We're not sure what the best way to expose the native store to users is
yet and it's a bit weird that you can use this in the `uv auth` commands
but can't use any of the other keyring provider options. The simplest
path forward is to just not expose it to users as a keyring provider,
and instead frame it as a preview alternative to the plaintext uv
credentials store. We can revisit the best way to expose configuration
before stabilization.
Note this pull request retains the _internal_ keyring provider
implementation — we can refactor it out later but I wanted to avoid a
bunch of churn here.
Adds locking of the credentials store for concurrency safety. It's
important to hold the lock from read -> write so credentials are not
dropped during concurrent writes.
I opted not to attach the lock to the store itself. Instead, I return
the lock on read and require it on write to encourage safe use. Maybe
attaching the source path to the store struct and adding a `lock(&self)`
method would make sense? but then you can forget to take the lock at the
right time. The main problem with the interface here is to write a _new_
store you have to take the lock yourself, and you could make a mistake
by taking a lock for the wrong path or something. The fix for that would
be to introduce a new `CredentialStoreHandle` type or something, but
that seems overzealous rn. We also don't eagerly drop the lock on token
read, although we could.
Adds a default plain text storage mechanism to `uv auth`.
While we'd prefer to use the system store, the "native" keyring support
is experimental still and I don't want to ship an unusable interface.
@geofft also suggested that the story for secure credential storage is
much weaker on Linux than macOS and Windows and felt this approach would
be needed regardless.
We'll switch over to using the native keyring by default in the future.
On Linux, we can now fallback to a plaintext store the secret store is
not configured, which is a nice property.
Right now, we store credentials in a TOML file in the uv state
directory. I expect to also read from the uv config directory in the
future, but we don't need it immediately.
Picks up the work from
- #14559
- https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/pull/14896
There are some high-level changes from those pull requests
1. We do not stash seen credentials in the keyring automatically
2. We use `auth login` and `auth logout` (for future consistency)
3. We add a `token` command for showing the credential that will be used
As well as many smaller changes to API, messaging, testing, etc.
---------
Co-authored-by: John Mumm <jtfmumm@gmail.com>
## Summary
Make the use of `Self` consistent. Mostly done by running `cargo clippy
--fix -- -A clippy::all -W clippy::use_self`.
## Test Plan
<!-- How was it tested? -->
No need.
## Summary
If `HF_TOKEN` is set, we'll automatically wire it up to authenticate
requests when hitting private `huggingface.co` URLs in `uv run`.
## Test Plan
An unauthenticated request:
```
> cargo run -- run https://huggingface.co/datasets/cmarsh/test/resolve/main/main.py
File "/var/folders/nt/6gf2v7_s3k13zq_t3944rwz40000gn/T/mainYadr5M.py", line 1
Invalid username or password.
^^^^^^^^
SyntaxError: invalid syntax
```
An authenticated request:
```
> HF_TOKEN=hf_... cargo run run https://huggingface.co/datasets/cmarsh/test/resolve/main/main.py
Hello from main.py!
```
By default, Rust does not support safe cast from `&U` to `&T` for
`#[repr(transparent)] T(U)` even if the newtype opts in. The dtolnay
ref-cast crate fills this gap, allowing to remove `DisplaySafeUrlRef`.
This PR implements a few review follow-ups from #13560. In particular,
it
* Makes `DisplaySafeUrlRef` implement `Copy` so that it can be passed by
value.
* Updates `to_string_with_credentials` methods with
`displayable_with_credentials`, returning an `impl Display` instead of
`String` for greater flexibility.
* Updates the `DisplaySafeUrl` and `DisplaySafeUrlRef` `Debug`
implementations to match the underlying `Url` `Debug` implementation
(with the exception that credentials are masked).
* Replaces an unnecessary `DisplaySafeUrl::from(Url::from_file_path`
with `DisplaySafeUrl::from_file_path`
Prior to this PR, there were numerous places where uv would leak
credentials in logs. We had a way to mask credentials by calling methods
or a recently-added `redact_url` function, but this was not secure by
default. There were a number of other types (like `GitUrl`) that would
leak credentials on display.
This PR adds a `DisplaySafeUrl` newtype to prevent leaking credentials
when logging by default. It takes a maximalist approach, replacing the
use of `Url` almost everywhere. This includes when first parsing config
files, when storing URLs in types like `GitUrl`, and also when storing
URLs in types that in practice will never contain credentials (like
`DirectorySourceUrl`). The idea is to make it easy for developers to do
the right thing and for the compiler to support this (and to minimize
ever having to manually convert back and forth). Displaying credentials
now requires an active step. Note that despite this maximalist approach,
the use of the newtype should be zero cost.
One conspicuous place this PR does not use `DisplaySafeUrl` is in the
`uv-auth` crate. That would require new clones since there are calls to
`request.url()` that return a `&Url`. One option would have been to make
`DisplaySafeUrl` wrap a `Cow`, but this would lead to lifetime
annotations all over the codebase. I've created a separate PR based on
this one (#13576) that updates `uv-auth` to use `DisplaySafeUrl` with
one new clone. We can discuss the tradeoffs there.
Most of this PR just replaces `Url` with `DisplaySafeUrl`. The core is
`uv_redacted/lib.rs`, where the newtype is implemented. To make it
easier to review the rest, here are some points of note:
* `DisplaySafeUrl` has a `Display` implementation that masks
credentials. Currently, it will still display the username when there is
both a username and password. If we think is the wrong choice, it can
now be changed in one place.
* `DisplaySafeUrl` has a `remove_credentials()` method and also a
`.to_string_with_credentials()` method. This allows us to use it in a
variety of scenarios.
* `IndexUrl::redacted()` was renamed to
`IndexUrl::removed_credentials()` to make it clearer that we are not
masking.
* We convert from a `DisplaySafeUrl` to a `Url` when calling `reqwest`
methods like `.get()` and `.head()`.
* We convert from a `DisplaySafeUrl` to a `Url` when creating a
`uv_auth::Index`. That is because, as mentioned above, I will be
updating the `uv_auth` crate to use this newtype in a separate PR.
* A number of tests (e.g., in `pip_install.rs`) that formerly used
filters to mask tokens in the test output no longer need those filters
since tokens in URLs are now masked automatically.
* The one place we are still knowingly writing credentials to
`pyproject.toml` is when a URL with credentials is passed to `uv add`
with `--raw`. Since displaying credentials is no longer automatic, I
have added a `to_string_with_credentials()` method to the `Pep508Url`
trait. This is used when `--raw` is passed. Adding it to that trait is a
bit weird, but it's the simplest way to achieve the goal. I'm open to
suggestions on how to improve this, but note that because of the way
we're using generic bounds, it's not as simple as just creating a
separate trait for that method.
We were not correctly falling back to cached realm credentials when an
index URL was provided with only a username. This came up in a [later
comment](https://github.com/astral-sh/uv/issues/13443#issuecomment-2881115301)
on #13443 where credentials in a pip extra index in `uv.toml` were being
ignored when the same URL (but with only a username) was used at the
command line for `--extra-index-url`. I've added a test to catch this
case.
Closes#13443
This PR redacts credentials in displayed URLs.
It mostly relies on a `redacted_url` function (and where possible
`IndexUrl::redacted`). This is a quick way to prevent leaked credentials
but it's prone to programmer error when adding new trace statements. A
better follow-on would use a `RedactedUrl` type with the appropriate
`Display` implementation. This would allow us to still extract
credentials from the URL while displaying it securely. On the plus side,
the sites where the `redacted_url` function are used serve as easy
signposts for where to use the new type in a future PR.
Closes#1714.
uv’s default index strategy was designed with dependency confusion
attacks in mind. [According to the
docs](https://docs.astral.sh/uv/configuration/indexes/#searching-across-multiple-indexes),
“if a package exists on an internal index, it should always be installed
from the internal index, and never from PyPI”. Unfortunately, this is
not true in the case where authentication fails on that internal index.
In that case, uv will simply try the next index (even on the
`first-index` strategy). This means that uv is not secure by default in
this common scenario.
This PR causes uv to stop searching for a package if it encounters an
authentication failure at an index. It is possible to opt out of this
behavior for an index with a new `pyproject.toml` option
`ignore-error-codes`. For example:
```
[[tool.uv.index]]
name = "my-index"
url = "<index-url>"
ignore-error-codes = [401, 403]
```
This will also enable users to handle idiosyncratic registries in a more
fine-grained way. For example, PyTorch registries return a 403 when a
package is not found. In this PR, we special-case PyTorch registries to
ignore 403s, but users can use `ignore-error-codes` to handle similar
behaviors if they encounter them on internal registries.
Depends on #12651Closes#9429Closes#12362
Some registries (like Azure Artifact) can require you to authenticate
separately for every package URL if you do not authenticate for the
/simple endpoint. These changes make the auth middleware aware of index
URL endpoints and attempts to fetch keyring credentials for such an
index URL when making a request to any URL it's a prefix of.
The current uv behavior is to cache credentials either at the request
URL or realm level. But with these changes, we also need to cache
credentials at the index level. Note that when uv does not detect an
index URL for a request URL, it will continue to apply the old behavior.
Addresses part of #4056Closes#4583Closes#11236Closes#11391Closes#11507
I noticed in the trace output that we weren't obfuscating the
`Credentials` password in a trace message. This PR creates a `Password`
newtype with a custom `Debug` implementation.
## Summary
I noticed that these only support Basic credentials, but we may want to
allow users to provide Bearer tokens? This PR just generalizes the type.
We were not applying the `authenticate = "always"` behavior to `uv pip`
commands (related to #12362). This PR addresses that, applying
authentication policies wherever we set up a registry client.
## Summary
This PR modifies the requirement source entities to store a (new)
container struct that wraps `IndexUrl`. This will allow us to store
user-defined metadata alongside `IndexUrl`, and propagate that metadata
throughout resolution.
Specifically, I need to store the "kind" of the index (Simple API vs.
`--find-links`), but I also ran into this problem when I tried to add
support for overriding `Cache-Control` headers on a per-index basis: at
present, we have no way to passing around metadata alongside an
`IndexUrl`.
Previously, we required a username to perform a fetch from the keyring
because the `keyring` CLI only supported fetching password for a given
service and username. Unfortunately, this is different from the keyring
Python API which supported fetching a username _and_ password for a
given service. We can't (easily) use the Python API because we don't
expect `keyring` to be installed in a specific environment during
network requests. This means that we did not have parity with `pip`.
Way back in https://github.com/jaraco/keyring/pull/678 we got a `--mode
creds` flag added to `keyring`'s CLI which supports parity with the
Python API. Since `keyring` is expensive to invoke and we cannot be
certain that users are on the latest version of keyring, we've not added
support for invoking keyring with this flag. However, now that we have a
mode that says authentication is _required_ for an index (#11896), we
might as well _try_ to invoke keyring with `--mode creds` when there is
no username. This will address use-cases where the username is
non-constant and move us closer to `pip` parity.
This addresses a small part of #12280, namely when you have
`authenticate` set to `always`, it will output a distinct error message
for the case where you have a username but are missing a password.
Adds a new optional key `auth-policy` to `[tool.uv.index]` that sets the
authentication policy for the index URL.
The default is `"auto"`, which attempts to authenticate when necessary.
`"always"` always attempts to authenticate and fails if the endpoint is
unauthenticated. `"never"` never attempts to authenticate.
These policy address two kinds of cases:
* Some indexes don’t fail on unauthenticated requests; instead they just
forward to the public PyPI. This can leave the user confused as to why
their package is missing. The "always" policy prevents this.
* "never" allows users to ensure their credentials couldn't be leaked to
an unexpected index, though it will only allow for successful requests
on an index that doesn't require credentials.
Closes#11600
## Summary
This lets us drop a dependency entirely. `percent-encoding` is used by
`url` and so is already in the graph, whereas `urlencoding` isn't used
by anything else.
